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Abstract 
This paper studies inventory and pricing policies in a non-cooperative supply chain with one supplier and several 
retailers who are involved in producing, delivering and selling a single product. We consider inventory policies in an 
information-asymmetric vendor managed inventory. The study brings up a scenario where a supplier produces the 
product at thewholesale price to multiple retailers. The retailers also distribute the product in dispersed and 
independent markets at retail selling prices. The demand rate for each market is a non-decreasing concave function of 
the marketing expenditures of both local retailers and the manufacturer, but a non-increasing and convex function of 
the retail selling prices. The primary purpose is to determine wholesale price, marketing expenditure for supplier and 
retailers,  replenishment cycles for the product, and backorder quantity to maximize the total profit for both groups of 
supplier and retailers. The scenario is modeled as a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and the 
retailers are the followers.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction 
An optimal inventory policy normally has important effect on profitability of an organization. The 
proper inventory policy leads to a better performance of an organization and achievement organizational 
objectives.These policies can reduce inventory levels, replenishment rate, inventory cost and among  these 
policies;Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) is one of the most important strategies which improves the 
inventory management in supply chains. In a VMI system, a vendor normally determines the appropriate 
inventory levels for all his retailers and the proper inventory policies to maintain these levels. TheVMI 
partnerships have different purposes such as reducing the inventory levels and replenishment cost for the 
supply chain. A VMI partnership has two main characteristics: (1) VMI mainly focuses on integrated 
inventory management by the vendor with the cooperation of his retailers, and (2) the vendor is aware of 
his retailers’ inventory and market information for the implementation of VMI (yu et al., 2009). During 
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the past decade, the advantage of using VMI in production units have been studied by many people (e.g., 
Aviv and Federgruen,1998; Cachon and Fisher, 2000; yu et al., 2009). However, the effects of having a 
good pricing strategy on optimal ordering size in VMI model have never been taken place. In this paper, 
we consider a scenario of a supply chain based on pricing and inventory policies where, in this supply 
chain, a vendor and multiple retailers are involved in producing, delivering and selling only one single 
finished product. This supply chain therefore has two levels of retailers and the manufacturer. Each 
retailer buys the product from themanufacturer at the wholesale price, and then sells it to its customer at a 
retail price. Retailers’ markets are assumed to be geographically dispersed and independent from each 
other. Therefore, the competition and transshipment between the regional retailers are omitted. The 
demand rate in each local retail market isassumed to be non-decreasing function of the advertising 
investments made by the corresponding local retailer and the manufacturer, and a non-increasing function 
of the retail price. We model a scenario for our supply chain case study as a Stackelberg game (Chen, 
Federgruen, & Zheng, 2001; Lau & Lau, 2004; Lau, Lau, &Zhou, 2007; Yu et al, 2009). This paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 describes the assumptions and the necessary notations which are used to 
explain the proposed model. Section 3 develops our general Stackelberg model for the scenario and 
Finally, conclusion remarks are presented at the end to summarize the contribution of the paper. 
2. Assumptions and notations 
We study a Stackelberg game for a manufacturer and his multiple retailers in VMI-type supply chains 
and use similar notations and assumptions used in similar works of Yu et al., (2009) . 
2.1. Assumptions 
There are a supplier or manufacturer and multiple heterogeneous retailers. The manufacturer produces 
into one type of products with a fixed production rate, and replenishes the product to its retailers. The 
retailers are independently serving their individual markets. The demand for each retailer is a non-
increasing and convex function with respect to his retail price, retailers’ advertising costs and 
manufacturer’s advertising costs (Samuelson, 1947; Vives, 1990); Based on the VMI strategy, the 
supplier is responsible for the chain wide two-echelon inventories which include the finished product’s 
inventories at the retailers’ sides and the supplier’s side depicted by Fig. 1; There is a leader-follower 
relationship between the supplier (manufacturer) and the retailers. According to the VMI strategy, all the 
necessary market information of the retailers are available for the supplier and the supplier completely 
benefit to better serve the retailers. 
2.2. Notations 
• Indices 
n: number of retailers 
j: index of the retailers 
• Parameters 
Cm: manufacturing cost for per unit finished product ($/unit)  
Hrj: retailer j’s holding cost ($/unit/time) 
Hm: the manufacturer’s holding cost per unit finished product of inventory ($/unit/time) 
Lrj: retailer j’s backorder cost ($/unit/time) 
Srj: retailer j’s fixed order cost ($ for one time)  
Sm: the manufacturer’s fixed order cost for a common cycle time for the finished product ($/order setup) 
φj: transportation cost per unit finished product shipped from the manufacturer to the retailer j ($/unit)  
γj: inventory cost for retailer j ($/unit/time) 
P: production rate of the finished product for the manufacturer 
• Variables  
aj: advertising investment for retailer j ($/time) 
4284  Hongtao Shao et al. / Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 4282 – 4286 Hongtao Shao et al / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 3
Prj: retail price charged by retailer j ($/unit) 
A: advertising investment for manufacturer ($/time) 
Pmj: wholesale price of the finished product set by the manufacturer for retailer j ($/unit)  
bj: fraction of backlogging rate in a cycle for retailer j ($/time) 
C: common replenishment cycle time for the finished product  
• Functions 
Dj(Prj , aj, A): demand rate of the finished product in market j served by retailer j, a non-increasing and 
convex function of Prj and a non-decreasing and concave function of ajand A (unit/time) 
TICm: the manufacturers total inventory cost ($/time) 
TICr: retailers’ total inventory cost ($/time) 
Nprj: net profit for retailer j ($/time) 
Npm: net profit for the manufacturer ($/time) 
3. The Stackelberg game model 
This section models the scenario as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game where the manufacturer acts 
as the leader and retailers act as the followers. Their net profits are considered as the players’ 
payoff/utility functions for maximization. The manufacturer’s decisions and retailers’ decisions are 
determined for the scenario. In order to make the Stackelberg game model more easier to follow and more 
applicable, this model will be started with a generic demand function Dj(Prj , aj, A). In the scenario, we 
assume that the inventory levels for the retailers and the manufacturer have the trend shown in Fig 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1:The product inventory level 
3.1A scenario 
In the scenario, the inventory policy is an information-asymmetric VMI and the producer provides a 
single product at the same wholesale price to multiple retailers (Pm). The payoff function (net profit) for 
each player is equal to its revenue minus its total cost. 
• Net profit of each retailer 
The revenue of retailer j is Prj Dj(Prj , aj, A). Its cost includes three components: product cost Pm Dj(Prj , 
aj, A),  advertising investment aj, and inventory cost γjDj(Prj , aj, A) is proportion to its demand. The order, 
backorder and holding costs do not appear in retailer’s cost formula since supplier is responsible for it 
based on VMI rules. The net profit for retailer j can be given by  
, ,Np P P r D P Arj jrj m j rj jα
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠                                                                                                        (1) 
• Net profit of manufacturer 
The total revenue for the manufacturer comes from the selling of the product to its retailers at 
wholesale price Pm given by (1). The total cost also consists of manufacturer's inventory cost (TICm), the 
retailers’ inventory cost (TICr) and the advertising investment (A). Based on Fig. 1, in a supply chain, it 
is not unusual for the manufacturer to assume a common replenishment period for all its retailers 
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(Banerjee & Burton, 1994; Chakravarty & Goyal, 1986; Chen & Chen, 2005; Mitra & Chatterjee, 2004;). 
Therefore we have ( ) ( )
2 2, ,
1 , ,1 12
D P A Cj rj jn nTIC S H C D P AM m m m j rj jj jC P
α
α
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= + +⎢ ⎥∑ ∑
= =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                 (2) 
The first term in Eq. (2) is the sum of the setup and the holding cost of manufacturer’s side and the 
second term is the production cost. Retailers’ inventory cost includes order cost, holding cost, backorder 
cost and transportation cost. 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
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∑                                       (3)
Therefore, the net profit of the manufacturer is computed as follows, 
( ), ,1nNp P D P A TIC TIC Am m j rj j m rj α= − − −∑ =                                                                                                    (4)
The first proposed Stackelberg game model is formulated as follows, 
max ( ,..., , , , ) ( , , )1
1
m
n
Np b b C A P P D P a A TIC TIC An m m j rj j m r
j
= − − −∑
=
                                                                                 (4)
subject to 
( , , )
1
n
D P a A Pj rj j
j
≤∑
=
                                                                                                                                (5)
0 1, 1,...,b j nj≤ ≤ =                                                                                                                                       (6)
, , 0C A Pm≥                                                                                                                                             (7)
and 
max ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) , 1,...Np P a P P D P a A a j nrj rj j rj m j j rj jγ= − − − =                                                                                     (8)
subject to 
, 1,...P P j nrj m jγ> + =                                                                                                                                (9)
, 0, 1,...P a j nrj j ≥ =                                                                                                                                    (10) 
The Stackelberg equilibrium  
The Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained using a backward procedure. Based on this procedure, the 
followers’ (retailer) problem must be solved first to get the response functions of the leader’s 
(manufacturer) decisions. In the next step, the manufacturer’s decision problem is solved by attending all 
possible reactions of the followers to maximize the net profit. Every follower’s optimal response can be 
determined by considering the manufacturer’s decisions as its input parameters. Finally, the leader finds 
its optimal decision by assuming that the followers take the optimal response. 
In our model, the best response functions established analytically for the retailers since they are 
involved and we are faced with relatively large number of variables. 
Retailers’ best response functions 
By taking the first derivative of Eq. (8) with respect to aj, we have 
( , ) ( , , )
( ) 1, 1,...
Np P a D P a Arj rj j j rj j
P P j nrj m ja aj j
γ
∂ ∂
= − − − =
∂ ∂
                                                                                     (11)
Solving
( , )
0
Np P arj rj j
a j
∂
=
∂
yields the critical point of the equation with Dj(Prj , aj , A) as non-decreasing and 
concave function of aj. Since
2 ( , )
02
Np P arj rj j
arj
∂
≤
∂
,only one critical point exists and it is a function of (Prj,A). 
The critical point is the optimal solution of retailer j for any given (Prj,A) denoted as 
* * ( , ), 1,... .a a P A j nj j rj= =                                                                                                                             (12)
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Taking the first derivative of Nprj (Prj, aj*) with respect to Prj yields, 
1 * * *( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , )*( , , ) ( )( ) 0
Np P a D P a A D P a A a P Arj rj j j rj j j rj j j rj
D P a A P Pj rj j rj m jP P a Prj rj j rj
γ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + − − + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
                                        (13) 
4. We get the optimal solution Prj* by solving Eq. (13). This equation has at least one critical point 
otherwise,Nprj (Prj, aj*) will be a monotone function of Prj. Based on a given specific demand function, 
Eqs. (12) and(13) are the best response functions for retailer j. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented an optimal pricing and lot sizing model in a two echelon supply chain 
with one producer and multiple retailers. The proposed model of this paper has been studied under a 
scenario combined with a Stackelberg game. The idea of this paper to combine the Stackelberg game with 
two levels supply chain could be extended for more complicated situations such multi producer and leave 
it for interested readers as future research. 
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